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Abstract 
Buss, S.R., Intuitionistic validity in T-normal Kripke structures, Annals of Pure and Applied 
Logic 59 (1993) 159-173. 
Let T be a first-order theory. A T-normal Kripke structure is one in which every world is a 
classical model of T. This paper gives a characterization of the intuitionistic theory XT of 
sentences intuitionistically valid (forced) in all T-normal Kripke structures and proves the 
corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. For Peano arithmetic (PA), the theory 
XPA is a proper subtheory of Heyting arithmetic (HA), so HA is complete but not sound for 
PA-normal Kripke structures. 
1. Introduction 
A Kripke structure for first-order intuitionistic logic may be viewed as a set of 
classical first-order structures, called worlds, which are partially ordered by a 
reachability relation. If a world Ju, is reachable from Jbll, then &, is embedded in 
Jt$ so that each atomic formula which holds in ~2, also holds in J112. The 
interpretation of equality in a world need not be true equality; hence it is 
permissable that two non-equal elements of a world are equal in a reachable 
world. 
For JU a world in a Kripke structure and Q, a first-order formula, the notion of 
Q, being intuitionistically true or ‘forced’ at JU is defined inductively on the 
complexity of CJL For example, ‘I@ is forced at JU if 11, is not forced at any world 
reachable from JU. (We give the definition in full below.) One can also regard the 
classical truth or falsity of p, in ~2 by ignoring the rest of the worlds and just 
considering the usual classical (Tarskian) semantics of truth in the structure &. 
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If T is a classical first-order theory in a language 3, then a T-normal Kripke 
structure is a Kripke structure for intuitionistic logic in the language _CE in which 
each world classically satisfies T. The first-order sentences which are intuitionisti- 
tally valid (or, forced) in all T-normal Kripke structures clearly form an 
intuitionistic theory, denoted XT. The main result of this paper is to give an 
axiomatization of XT; namely, by 
{ OV+ q: 8 is semipositive and T t, lo} 
(Complete definitions are given below.) We examine carefully the case of Peano 
and Heyting arithmetic (PA and HA) in the language of primitive recursive 
arithmetic (PRA) and show that HA properly contains SWA and thus HA is 
complete, but not sound, for PA-normal Kripke structures. 
From a philosophical point of view, it may seem rather strange to consider the 
intuitionistic theory of T-normal Kripke structures since this involves a mixing of 
the notions of classical truth and intuitionistic truth. However, this does make 
sense if one takes the view that intuitionistic logic is to be interpreted in the 
setting of (possible) states of knowledge or in the setting of possible states of 
databases. For example, Nerode [3] motivates intuitionist logic as modeling 
assertions about the possible contents of a database at various times. For this, one 
may have a set of constraints classically true for any possible database; the 
constraints form the classical theory T. The theory XT is then the sentences 
which are intuitionistically valid for Kripke structures of databases satisfying the 
constraints of T. 
Another reason for studying T-normal Kripke structures is that it allows 
model-theoretic techniques for classical logic to be applied to intuitionistic logic. 
This was the author’s original motivation and has already been applied in Buss [l] 
where the model-theoretic proof of an independence result for the classical theory 
PV, due to KrajiEek and Pudlak was used to reprove and strengthen an 
independence result due to Cook and Urquhart for the intuitionistic theory ZPV. 
Similarly, to prove that- a formula is an intuitionistic consequence of HA, it 
suffices to show that it is forced in all PA-normal Kripke structures. 
For Heyting arithmetic, the notion of PA-normal Kripke models has already 
been considered by van Dalen et al. [5] -they called such models ‘locally PA’. 
They show that any model of Heyting arithmetic on a finite frame is PA-normal 
and that models of Heyting arithmetic on a frame of order type o contain 
infinitely many classical models of PA. These results seem neither to imply nor be 
implied by the results of this paper. 
2. Definitions 
A classical model for classical first-order logic is defined as usual, using 
Tarskian semantics. We adopt the convention, however, that equality (=) in a 
classical model is interpreted and may not be the true equality; of course, the 
interpretation of equality must be an equivalence relation that respects the 
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functions and relations. The corresponding semantic notion for intuitionistic 
first-order logic is that of a Kripke model. We briefly review the definition of 
Kripke structures as models for intuitionistic logic; see Troelstra and van Dalen’s 
textbook [4] for a thorough treatment. 
Fix a first-order language 9. A Kripke structure X for the language _Y is an 
ordered pair ({JX~}~~~, <) where {&~}i~~ is a set of (not necessarily distinct) 
classical structures for the language .Z indexed by elements of the set 9 and 
where < is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on 9. The .&‘s are called 
worlds. To improve readability, we shall usually write 4 < .Mi instead of i <j 
even though this is an abuse of notation as the 4’s may not be distinct. X must 
satisfy the property that whenever Jlti < .&ti then & is a ‘weak substructure’ of J$ 
in that the domain ].&I of Jui is a subset of the domain of &j and for all atomic 
formulas Q1(X1, . . . , Xk) and all a,, . . . , ak E Id&l, if J& b ($7(a1, . . . , ak) then also 
AjkV(al,..., ak). Note that this allows unequal element in ]&I to become 
equal in ]JYj]. 
If 47 is a formula and if c E I.&] then we define Ju, b q(c), Jui cfassically satisfies 
q(c), as usual, ignoring the rest of the worlds in the Kripke structure. To define 
the intuitionistic semantics, &i It v(c), J& f orces q(c), is defined inductively on 
the complexity of Q, as follows:’ 
(1) If ~1 is atomic, J& It- ~1 if and only if J& k CJZJ. As a special case, 4 l,P 1. 
(2) If cp is r+9 A x then Jlli It cp if and only if & It v and Jlli It x. 
(3) If q is v v x then Ju, It Q, if and only if Jui It 1/, or J& It x. 
(4) If q is t/~+ x then J& 11 Q, if and only if for all ~j Z= Ai, if JUT It q then Jui It x. 
(5) If Q, is (3x)~(x) then &i 11 q if and only if there is some b E I+&] such that 
Jui I~ I. 
(6) If p is (Vx)t/~(x) then Juj It Q, if and only if for all &j + Jui and all b E 1.12~1, 
~j 1~ I. 
An immediate consequence of the definition of forcing is that if J& 11 cp and 
Jlli < &j then ~j It q; this is proved by induction on the complexity of q~. 
We shall use lq as an abbreviation for q+ 1. Hence, .& 1111) if and only if 
for all ~j * Ali, ~j f ?). 
A formula V(X) is valid in YL, denoted XIF q(x), if and only if for all worlds & 
and all c E I&], _,& It q(c). A set of formulas r is valid in Y’, X IF r, if and only if 
every formula in r is valid in X. We define that r It cp, cp is a Kripke consequence 
of r, if and only if for every Kripke structure .7X, if .Y’t It r then YC It QX 
A theory is, by definition, a set of sentences closed under logical implication. 
(Formulas may contain free variables whereas sentences may not.) If r is an 
arbitrary set of sentences, we write Tki Q? and rk, q to indicate that the formula 
~1 is intuitionistically (respectively, classically) provable from the sentences in r. 
A set of sentences T is an intuitionistic (resp., classical) theory if and only if T is 
1 A more proper notation would be (X, A,) IF q(c) or even (X, i) k q(c) but we use the simpler 
notation ~64, Ikq(c) when TL is specified by the context. 
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closed under intuitionionistic (resp., classical) provability. Hence, T pi 9 (resp., 
T kc tp) if and only if the universal closure of Q, is in T. 
Let r be a set of sentences and p, a formula. The strong soundness and 
completeness theorems for classical logic state that r1, Q, if and only if rk q. 
Likewise, the strong soundness and completeness theorems for intuitionistic logic 
and Kripke structures state that Tt-i QJ if and only if r + q. 
Definition. Let T be a classical theory. A Kripke structure 3% is said to be 
T-normal if and only if, for each world .4Z of X, M classically satisfies T (i.e., 
MkT). 
Definition. A formula 8 is semipositive if and only if each subformula of 8 of the 
form 8,-, O2 has Or atomic. Since lq!~ abbreviates q + I, this implies that any 
negated subformula of 8 is atomic. 
Definition. Let 8 and Q, be formulas. The formula Oq is obtained from 6 by 
replacing each atomic subformula x of 8 with (x v q~). 
In forming Oq, bounded variables in 0 are renamed as necessary so that no free 
variable of Q, is bound in 8. The definition of OV is originally due to H. Friedman 
[2] who called it the ~-translation of 8. 
Definition. Let T be a classical theory. Then XT is the intuitionistic theory 
axiomatized by the (universal closures of the) formulas 
{V-t q: 8 is a semipositive formula, T kclB, and QJ is any formula}. 
Note that if 8 is atomic and T kc 8 then SYT ti 8. To see this, note that 18 is 
semipositive and T kc 78. Now, the formula (10) ’ is (8 v 0) -+ (I v 0) since 33 
abbreviates 8+ 1. So XT has the axiom (10) ‘* 0 which obviously intuitionisti- 
tally implies 8. Likewise, if 8 is atomic and T kc18 then XT tii8. To see this 
use the axiom O1 + I of XT. 
Both of the latter observations are corollaries of the completeness theorem 
proved in the next section. The soundness theorem further implies the converses; 
namely, if 8 is atomic or negated atomic and if XT ti 8 then T t-, 8. In fact the 
soundness theorem implies that XT c T. 
It is easy to see that (p + tYq is intuitionistically valid for all formulas q and 8. 
Hence XT ki 8 ‘p * cp for all semipositive 0 such that T t, 18. 
3. Soundness and completeneness 
We next establish the soundness and completeness theorems for the intuitionis- 
tic theory ZT with respect to T-normal Kripke structures. We treat the 
soundness theorem first since its proof is by far the simpler. 
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Theorem 1 (Soundness Theorem). Let T be a classical theory. If XT Ii q and if 
.X is a T-normal Kripke model, then .Xlt v, 
Proof. It clearly suffices to prove the soundness theorem for the case where q is 
an axiom of XT; i.e., when r/~ is a formula eP+ Q, where 0 is semipositive and 
T t, 18. If Jzc is a classical structure, we define an .&formula to be a formula in 
the language of T plus constant symbols for members of the universe of Jt. To 
prove the soundness theorem, it will suffice to prove that if Ju is a world in a 
T-normal Kripke structure X, 8 and Q, are A-sentences, 8 is semipositive and 
T I,18 then eV-, 97 is intuitionistically forced true in JH. To prove this we need 
the following claim: 
Claim. Suppose 5°C is a Kripke structure, .AI is a world in X, I3 is a semipositive 
A-sentence and q~ is a At-sentence. Zf ~44 P p, and JU It eq then JU F 8. 
The soundness theorem follows immediately from the claim since every world 
in X classically satisfies T and hence 18. 
The proof of the claim is by induction on the logical complexity of 8. Suppose 
JU It f9V but JU lP (p. If 8 is atomic, then BP is 8 v Q, and the claim is obvious from 
the definition of forcing. If 8 is a formula of the form 8i v 19~ then 13~ is f3;P v 0T 
and &II- eV implies that .A% It @’ or JU It 8 4. And by the induction hypothesis, 
JU k f3i or Ju k & and hence Ju k 0. The case where 8 is a conjunction is handled 
similarly. If 8 is of the form (3x)8,(x), then there is some m E [Jul such that 
Ju It O?(m) so by the induction hypothesis Ju k O,(m) and hence Jt k 8. The case 
where 13 begins with a universal quantifier is similar and uses the fact that B’p is 
forced in any world reachable from 4. Finally, suppose 8 is a formula of the form 
8,+ &. Since 8 is semipositive, 8, must be atomic; thus t?‘p is the formula 
(0, v q)+ (02”). Since 0, is atomic, Jbl It o1 if and only if JU b 8,. Now if JR UC 19~ 
then clearly Juk 8. On the other hand, if J.?X It 8, then Ju It @‘; hence, by the 
induction hypothesis, .M l= I& and, again, JU b 0. q Theorem 1 
Theorem 2 (Completeness Theorem). Let T be a classical theory and QI be any 
sentence. Zf XT vi Q, then there is a T-normal Kripke structure X such that X F ~1. 
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 show that XT is the intuitionistic theory of 
T-normal Kripke structures. 
The proof of Theorem 2 takes the rest of this section and will proceed along the 
lines of the proof of the usual strong completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic 
as exposited in Section 2.6 of Troelstra and van Dalen [4]. The new ingredient 
and the most difficult part in our proof is Lemma 4 which ensures that the Kripke 
structure we construct is T-normal. 
We let T be a fixed classical theory for the rest of this section. For simplicity, 
we assume that T and its language are countable; however, the proof can be 
readily extended to uncountable languages. 
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Definition. Let C be a set of constant symbols. A C-formulas or C-sentence is a 
formula or sentence in the language of T plus constant symbols in C. All sets of 
constants are presumed to be countable. 
Definition. A set of C-sentences r is C-saturated provided the following hold: 
(1) r is intuitionistically consistent. 
(2) For all C-sentences Q, and 3, if Tti 47 v ~JJ then Tti cp or rl-i +. 
(3) For all C-sentences (3x)q(x), if Tt-i (3x)q(x) then for some c E C, 
rki V,(c)* 
The next, well-known lemma shows that C-saturated sets can be readily 
constructed. 
Lemma 3. Let r be a set of sentences and 9, be a sentence such ‘that r vi q. Zf C is 
a set of constant symbols containing all constants in rplus countably infinitely many 
new symbols, then there is a C-saturated set I’* containing Z’such that r* vi Q?. 
The proof of Lemma 3 is quite simple, merely enumerate with repetitions all 
C-sentences which either begin with an existential quantifier or are a disjunction 
and then form r* by adding new sentences to r so that (2) and (3) of the 
definition of C-saturated are satisfied. This can be done so that Q, is still not an 
intuitionistic consequence. For example, if during the construction of r* we 
enumerate a formula (~x)~JJ(x) which is an intuitionistic consequence of the 
sentences already in r* then we can pick any constant c from C that does (yet) 
occur in I’* or in p, and put the formula I&(C) into r*. This will preserve the 
property that r* 31 q. (For a full proof, refer to Lemma 2.6.3 of [4].) 0 
In the proof of the usual completeness theorem for Kripke models and 
intuitionistic logic, the C-saturated sets of sentences constructed with Lemma 3 
specify worlds in a canonical Kripke model. However, we need to construct a 
Kripke model which is T-normal and Lemma 3 does not provide us with sets r* 
that specify worlds that classically satisfy T. Instead, we need to establish the 
harder Lemma 4 below. 
A C-saturated set r defines a world with domain C in which an atomic formula 
Q, is forced if and only Tti (p. We shall also think of r specifying a classical 
structure .Mr- defined as follows: 
Definition. Suppose r is a C-saturated set. Then .Mr is defined to be the classical 
structure in the language of T plus constant symbols in C such that the domain of 
JUT is C itself (so Pr = c) and such that for every atomic C-sentence cp, &/llrk cp if 
and only if Tti q. 
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It is straightforward to check that the definition of A, does indeed specify a 
unique classical structure. The first thing to check is that the function and 
constant symbols of T can be uniquely interpreted. This follows from the fact that 
if t is a closed term then (3x)(x = t) is intuitionistically valid and hence, by 
C-saturation, there is some constant c E C such that Tti c = t. The second thing to 
notice is that equality is interpreted in A!, (i.e., =“Ur may not be true equality) 
since there may be distinct cr, c2 E C such that Tki c, = c2. It is easy to check that 
the requisite equality axioms hold (it suffices to do this for atomic formulas). 
In order to prove Theorem 2 we must construct sets Tso that the structures .Mr 
are classical models of T: Lemma 4 is the crucial tool for this: 
Lemma 4. Suppose r is a set of C-sentences, qz~ is a C-sentence and r 2 XT. 
Further suppose r vi q. Then there is a set r* of sentences and a set C* of 
constants such that 
(a) r* 3 r, 
(b) r* is C*-saturated, 
(c) r* vi P, and 
(d) .Ar*k T. 
Note that if condition (d) were omitted, Lemma 4 would be equivalent to 
Lemma 3. 
Proof. r* and At,. are constructed by a technique similar to Henkin’s proof of 
Godel’s completeness theorem. We pick C* to be C plus countably infinitely 
many new constant symbols and enumerate the C* formulas as LYE, mzu,, LYE, . . . 
with each C*-formula appearing infinitely many times in the enumeration. We 
shall form classically consistent sets of sentences K&,, 17,) II*, . . . so that K&, 2 T 
and so that, for all k, I& 2 I&_, and so that, for any C*-formula ol,, either rxj or 
laj eventually is put into a n,. Furthermore, if aj = (3x)p(x) and aj enters a n, 
then for some constant symbol c, p(c) will be in some I&.. Thus, as usual in a 
Henkin-style model construction, the union II* of the I&‘s will specify a classical 
model A of T with domain C*. 
While defining the set II, we also define sets r, and C, so that 
and such that C,, is C, C, 2 C-r, and C* = lJk C,. P will be the union of the 
c’s. Our construction must ensure that the Henkin model for fl* is the same as 
the model Are. 
Definition. Let D be a set of constants and A be a set of D-sentences. Then 
Thq[A, D] is the set 
{ 19: 8 is a sempositive D-sentence and A ti 8 “) 
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For us, the formula Q, is fixed, so we also denote this set by Th[A, D]. If A is a 
classical theory then the [A, D]-closure of A is the classical theory axiomatized by 
AU Th[A, D]. 
Definition. We define &J, to be r, Cc, to be C and I&, to be the 
T. For k > 0, II,, r, and C, are inductively defined by the 
depending on the value of k mod 5: 
[r, Cl-closure of 
: following cases 
(1) Suppose k = 5j + 1: Let r, = &_-l, let C, be C,_, plus the 
occuring in I_Y~, and: 
constant symbols 
(a) Let flk be IV&_, U {aj} U Th[&, Ck] if this theory is classically consistent. 
(b) Otherwise, let fl, be n,_, U {lq} U Th[&, C,]. 
(2) Suppose k = 5j + 2: Let fi = &_,. Note that by the previous case, aj is a 
Ck._,-sentence. If aj is of the form (3x)/3(x) and aj E II,_, then pick an arbitrary 
constant c E C*\C,_, and define C, = C,_, U {c} and let II, be the [Tk, C,J- 
closure of I&_, Up(c). Otherwise if mj does not begin with an existential 
quantifier or is not in 17k--1, let C, = C,_, and 17, = I&_,. 
(3) Suppose k = 5j + 3: Let C, = Ck-i. If a, is of the form p v y and if 
r,_, pi crj, then define as follows: 
(a) If the [G-1 U {P], &I- c osure 1 of &_, is classically consistent then II, 
defined to be equal to this theory and 4 is G-i U {p}. 
(b) Otherwise, r, is r,_, U {y} and I& is the [T,, &]-closure of &_,. 
If, however, oj is not a disjunction or is not an intuitionistic consequence of 
&_i, let r, = r,_, and I& = II_,. 
(4) Suppose k = 5j + 4: If ~j is of the form (3x)/3(x) and if r,_, pi ~j, then pick 
an arbitrary constant c E C*\C,_, and define C, = Ck-i U {c} and r, = r,_, U 
b(c) and define I& to be the [G, Ck]-closure of &_,. 
If, however, a; does not begin with an existential quantifier or is not an 
intuitionistic consequence of r _ k 1, let r, = r,_, and I& = l7,_, and C, = C,_,. 
(5) Suppose k = 5j + 5: Let C, = C,_,. If a;- is atomic and in n,_, then define 
r, = r,_, U { (uj} and I& to be the [Tk, CJ-closure of I&_,. Otherwise if Lyj is not 
atomic or is not in I&-i, let r, = r,_, and I& = II-,. 
Define 17* = lJk II, and I’* = lJk &. Note that C* = lJk C,. 
The points of cases (1) and (2) above is to make 17* a complete classical theory 
with witnesses for existential consequences. The point of cases (3) and (4) is to 
force r* to be C*-saturated. Case (5) serves to ensure that .Mr. will be equal to 
the Henkin model for IT*. The requirement that fl, contain Th[T,, C,] serves to 
maintain the condition that r, l/i q. 
Claim 1. For all k 3 0: 
(1) n, is classically consistent. 
t2) G Vi Q, Cso Gc is intuitionisticafly consistent). 
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Note that if r, ti QI, then r, ki I q and hence I& t, I and II,, is inconsistent. So 
to prove the claim, it suffices to show I& is consistent which we do by induction 
on k. The base case is k = 0. Suppose for a contradiction that 17, is inconsistent. 
Then Tl-,-@, v 10, v * . . v 10, for semipositive C-sentences 19, such that rti OT. 
By taking the conjunction of the Oi’s there is a single semipositive C-sentence 8 
such that T I,18 and Tti 8’9 But it is immediate then by definition of the axioms 
of XT that XT ti ov+- p Thus, since r 2 XT, Tli q; which is a contradiction. 
For the induction step, we first assume II,,_, is consistent and show that n, is 
consistent. We have five separate cases to consider. 
Stage k = 5j + 1. Let a; = wj(e) where e are all the C*-constants appearing in aj 
that are not already in C,_,. Let II; and II: be the [Tk, &]-closures of flk_l U aj 
and I&_, Uiaj, respectively. We need to show that at least one of these theories 
is classically consistent. Suppose both are inconsistent: then there are semiposi- 
tive C,-sentences 19,(e) and O,(e), where all 
that 
G-1 ti &(e)v, Ll ki h(e)? 
II-, t, aj(e)+lO,(e) and &-.I 
Then 
n,-, t,+x)(~.(x) A 6(x)) and 
occurrences of e are indicated, such 
L, Ii [(vx)(e,(x) A h4-w. 
Since &_, contains Th[&_,, C,_J, the semipositive &-,-sentence (Vx)(e,(x) A 
e,(x)) is in I&-i, contradicting the consistency of &_, . 
Stage k = 5j -I- 2. Suppose aj = (3x)@(x), IQ-1 t, ~j, and c E C*\Ck_i. If I& is 
inconsistent, there is a semipositive Ck_,-formula O(x) such that n,_, kc p(c)+ 
-@c) and G_, pi e(c)? Then, since c is a new constant symbol, 
rr,-, t, (sx)p(x)+ (3x)10( x an so II_, k,+k)e(x); also, r,_, ti[(Vx)e(x)]‘P. ) d 
But p_ge( x IS a semipositive G-,-sentence and &_, contains Th[r,_,, Ck_J, ) . 
so If,_, contains @x)@(x) which contradicts the induction hypothesis that 
I&_, is consistent. 
Stage k = 5j + 3. Suppose aj = p v y and Tti /3 v y. Let II; and nf be the 
[&_1 U {p}, C,]-closure and [G_1 U {y}, C,]-closure of 17k--1, respectively. 
Suppose, for sake of a contradiction, that I& is inconsistent and hence both IIC, 
and II: are inconsistent. Then there are semipositive C,-sentences 0, and Od such 
that &_, ti/3+(0,)” and &_, ti y+ (8,)q and such that I&_, 1‘18, and 
flk_l t,lO,. Since r,_, ti ~j, r,_, ki (0, v Od)q and hence the semipositive 
sentence 8, v 0, is in 17k--1. But this contradicts the induction hypothesis that 
I&_., is consistent. 
stage k = 5i + 4. Suppose aj = @X)/?(X), &_, ti aj and c E C*\C,_,. If I& is 
inconsistent, then there is a sempositive C,_,-sentence B(x) such that 
17,_, 1,+3(c) and &_, tip(c)-, (e(c))? S‘ mce c is a new constant symbol, 
&_, t-c (Vx)le(x) and likewise, since &_, ki (3x)/&(x), G_, t-i (3x)8(x)q. Hence 
168 S.R. Buss 
the semipositive C,_,-sentence (3x)8(x) is in &_, which contradicts the 
consistency of &,. 
Stage k = 5j + 5. Suppose a+ is atomic and in lIk_,. Suppose that 17, is 
inconsistent. Then there is a semipositive C,-sentence 8 such that &_, k,l8 and 
&_, Ii ajyi-, OV. By the remark at the end of Section 2, we also have r,_, ti (aj v 
V)-+ BV; in other words, rk-1 ti ((Uj* 0) p. Hence the semipositive sentence 
aj+ 8 is in U,_, and thus flk_, !-c 8, which contradicts the induction hypothesis 
that I&__, is consistent. 
This completes the proof of Claim 1. q 
Claim 2. If x is atomic, then r* ti x if and only if II* ‘rc x. 
To prove Claim 2, first suppose that r* Fix. Then for some k, x is a 
&-sentence and fi ki X; hence, r, ti x v QL In other words, r, pi xv. Since IIk 
contains Th[I’,‘,, C,], I& kc qx Conversely, if 17* t,x then some I& k, x. Now, 
for some large enough j, x is equal to aj and x E ~j;i+s. Cl 
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 4. Recall r* = lJk r, and 
17* = lJk &. By choice of constant symbols, C* = Uk C,. Clearly fl* is a 
consistent, complete theory and since the ~j’S enumerate all C*-formulas, 
whenever 17* kc (3x)p(x) then 17* t, /3(c) for some c E C*. Hence, the Henkin 
construction gives us a model Jll with domain a set of equivalence classes of C* 
and & k T since JU k II* and II” 2 T. Furthermore, since r* and II* contain 
exactly the same atomic C*-sentences, .M,* is by definition equal to the Henkin 
model Jl. Thus condition (d) of Lemma 4 holds. Conditions (a)-(c) hold by the 
construction of r, and by Claim 1. q lLemma 4 
We are now ready to define the T-normal Kripke model Xfor the proof of the 
completeness theorem. Recall that a T-normal Kripke model is an ordered pair 
({Jlli>ie_99 =G) where 9 is an index set, each JZi k T and < is the reachability 
relation. The index set 4 will be the set of sets rof sentences such that 
(a) r is C-saturated (where C is the set of constant symbols appearing in 
sentences in r), 
(b) rz XT, and 
(c) JI%,& T. 
As an additional technical condition we require the set C of constants symbols 
be a coinfinite subset of some fixed countable set of constant symbols: this makes 
4 a set rather than a proper class. Note that 9 is non-empty by Lemma 4. The 
worlds of X are the structures Jllr such that r E 9. By the soundness theorem 
proved above, X It XT. The reachability relation < is defined by &n < JUG if and 
only if r, c r,. It is easy to check from the definitions that, if r, c r, then &, is a 
weak substructure of A,. Hence .7X is a T-normal Kripke model. 
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We are now ready to finish the proof of Theorem 2. Suppose X’T fi Q, for q an 
arbitrary sentence. by Lemma 4 there is a r E 9 such that r 31 q. It will suffice to 
prove that .&,-If Q, since then X UL cp. This follows from the next lemma which also 
implies that for any sentence 8, XT pi 8 if and only if 3% It 8; in other words, 9” is 
a T-normal, canonical Kripke model for XT. 
Lemma 5. For any C-saturated r E 9 and C-sentence I/I, 
~,lt ~ ~ Tti W. 
Proof (This is exactly like Lemma 2.6.5 of Troelstra and van Dalen [4].). The 
lemma is proved by induction on the complexity of r/~: 
Case 1: q is atomic. by definition of It and YC. 
Case 2: ~JJ is x h y. 
JUrltx A y B _~!I~lkx and JIXJ~ y 
e Ttix and Tti y by induction hypothesis 
~ T~iX/\y. 
Case 3: rj~ is x v y. Then 
Jur+x v y @ .Arllx or JUrlt y 
e r ti x or Tti y by induction hypothesis 
e rtiXVy by C-saturation of I’. 
Case 4: qj is (3x)x(x). Then 
J&At (3x)x(x) e 3c E c, J&-II-X(C) 
e 3C E C, TtiX(C) by induction hypothesis 
e rki (3x)x(x) by C-saturation of r. 
Case 5: II, is x+ y. (+) First suppose Tt-i x-+ y. We must show that if 
JU~< Arz and Al, I/-x then At, Ik y. Since r, 2 r, r, Ii x* y. Hence, if Ju, Itx 
then, by the induction hypothesis r, ti x, so r, pi y and, again by the induction 
hypothesis, At, It y. 
(+) Second suppose r l/i x-f y. By Lemma 4, since r U {x} b’i y, there is a 
JU, > .A!, such that x E G and G 31 y. NOW, by the induction hypothesis twice, 
JI1,ltx and .Mnlr y; so At,-LILx-, y. 
Case 6: 3 is (Vx)x(x). (+) First suppose Tti (VX)X(X). Further suppose 
JU, Z= At, G is &-saturated and c E Cz. Then r, ti x(c) since G 2 r and by the 
induction hypothesis, JU, I!- x(c). Hence Ark (Vx)x(x). 
(3) Second suppose r l/i (Vx)x(x). If c is a new constant symbol not in C, 
then r b’i x(c). By Lemma 4 there is a world A, + A, such that & 31 x(c) with c a 
constant symbol in the language of r,. Now by the induction hypothesis, 
A, v x(c) so .AtruL (VX)X(X). q Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 
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4. Examples 
4.1. Pure first-order logic 
Pure first-order logic is a first-order theory in an arbitrary language with no 
nonlogical axioms. Let T be pure classical ogic in some language. Of course, any 
Kripke structure is T-normal. Hence the above soundness and completeness 
theorem combined with the usual soundness and completeness theorems for 
intuitionistic logic and Kripke structures immediately imply that XT is the 
intuitionistic version of pure first-order logic. 
Another way to prove this is to use the definition of XT and Lemma 3.5.3(i) of 
Troelstra-van Dalen [4]. 
4.2. Peano arithmetic 
We shall next consider Peano arithmetic (PA) with the language of PRA, that 
is, containing nonlogical symbols for every primitive recursive function and 
relation. Because of the choice of language, XPA proves the law of the excluded 
middle for atomic (primitive recursive) formulas. To see this, let R(x) be atomic. 
There is a predicate symbol Q such that PA kc R(c) ++lQ(x). In a PA-normal 
Kripke structure X and in any world JU of .?“, for any c E I.&I, we claim that 
J/t It R(c) v lR(c). 
This is so since if R(c) is classically true in A, then JU IF R(c) by definition. 
Otherwise, Q(c) is classically true in & and every world accessible from Ju. 
Hence R(c) can not be true in any world accessible from .M, so .M klR(c). 
Alternatively, the law of excluded middle for primitive recursive properties can 
be proof-theoretically established by considering the XT axiom 
(1R v lQ)RVQ+ (R v Q). 
Theorem 6. XPA is a subtheory of HA. 
Proof. This is immediate from Friedman’s theorem that if PA t-, 8 then HA ti fILlrn 
where 8 and 47 are arbitrary formulas. Cl 
In a moment we shall see that XPA does not equal Heyting arithmetic HA; but 
first we prove that XPA does admit induction on existential formulas. By 
‘existential formula’ we mean a formula with a prefix of existential formulas and 
no other quantifiers. 
Theorem 7. Zf A(z) is an existential formula then XPA proves 
A(0) A (Vz)(A(z)-+A(z + l))+ (Vz)A(z). 
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Proof. We shall give a model-theoretic proof. Suppose A is a formula of the form 
(3x)R(z, X, 6) where b are parameters and R is w.1.o.g. atomic. Further suppose 
X is a Kripke structure, J& is a world in X, m are members of the universe of _4&,, 
and 
.&,I1 (3x)R(O, x, m) A (Vz)[(%)R(z, x, m)* (3x)R(z + 1, x, m)]. 
We must show that if Jt is reachable from J&) and if c E /Ju] then Ju It 
(3x)R(c, x, m). It is obvious from the definition of forcing that a existential 
formula is intuitionistically forced in Ju if and only if it is classically true in JU. 
Thus, we have 
.&k (3x)R(O, x, m) A (Vz)[@x)R(z, x, m)-+ (3x)R(z + 1, x, m)]. 
Hence, since JU b PA, (3x)R(c, x, m) is classically true and intuitionistically fored 
in.& 0 
A proof-theoretic proof of Proposition 7 can be obtained by letting 8 be the 
semipositive formula 
(3x)R(O, X, b) A (Vz)(~x,)[R(z, XI, b)+ (3x&+ + 1, xz, b)] 
A (Vx)-R(c, x, b) 
and letting p, be (3x)R( c, x, b). Now 8 is essentially the negation of the induction 
axiom for A(Z) and Tk, 18. Hence XT has Bq+ Q, as an axiom and it can be 
easily seen that this axiom intuitionistically implies the induction axiom for A(z). 
Theorem 8. XPA # HA. 
To prove Theorem 8 we will show that XPA does not prove induction on 
ZZ,-formulas (universal formulas). First, we need to develop a variant of Godel’s 
second incompleteness theorem in the next two lemmas. If II is an integer, then n 
is a canonical closed term with value n; if v is a formula with Godel number IZ, 
then r~l denotes the term 0. For n > 0, Z2, is the subtheory of PA with 
induction restricted to &-formulas (since our language is the language of PRA, 
we refrain from defining ZZ;, here). Recall that arithmetization of metamathemat- 
ics can be carried out in Z2r; for example, there is a sentence Cun(PA) which 
expresses the consistency of Peano arithmetic and there is a formula Thm,(w) 
which states that w is the Godel number of a theorem of PA. Likewise there are 
formulas Con(ZEa) and Thm&w): note especially that a is a free variable in 
these formulas. The usual Hilbert-Bernay derivability conditions hold, in particu- 
lar, if $J is an existential sentence then Z2, t, $J+ Thm,,,( ‘y’). 
Lemma 9 is well-known and provides motivation for Lemma 10. 
Lemma 9. Let T be PA or be one of the theories ZEi. Zf I/J is a existential sentence 
consistent with T then 
T + I/J l/c Con(T). 
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Proof. Since 11, is existential, T + 3 t, Thm,( ‘q’). Hence, 
T + v t, Con(T)-, Con(T + q). 
But by Godel’s second incompleteness theorem, T + I# I/= Con(T + I@), so 
T + 3 fc Con(T). 0 
For the next lemma, let the language of Peano arithmetic be enlarged to 
include a new uninterpreted constant symbol a. 
Lemma 10. Let +(a) be an existential sentence and T be the theory PA U {a > 0: 
n z 0} U ~(a). Zf T is consistent, then T lfc Con(Z,IYO). 
Proof (by contradiction). Suppose T kc Con(Z&). By compactness, there is an 
integer k such that 
ZZ;, U {a > k, q(a)} kc Con(Z2J. 
Hence, I& U {a > k, q(a)} kc Con(Z&). F rom this it follows immediately that 
Z& + (3x)(x > k A q(x)) t, Con(Z&); 
which contradicts Lemma 9. 0 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 8. We shall construct a PA-normal 
Kripke model .7C in which induction fails for the ZZ,-formula Con(Z,Ya). The 
worlds of X will be models J&, J&, J&, . . . of PA U {-Con(PA)} such that 
Jui < ~j if and only i si. Of course, in any such model Ju; there is a least 
(necessarily nonstandard) number Ui such that -Con(Z&) is classically true in J&. 
Pick J& to be an arbitrary countable model of PA U {lCon(PA)}. Now assume 
&. has been chosen; we describe how to pick J&+~. Let A(.&) be the atomic 
diagram of Jui; that is to say, the theory with constant symbols for each member 
of I.&l containing all atomic sentences true in Jui. Let b be a new constant 
symbol. Then J&+, is to be an arbitrary countable model of 
PA U A(J&) U {b < ai, iCon(Z 
Of course, we must show this theory is consistent. Suppose it is inconsistent: 
then, by compactness, there is a quantifier-free formula 6(d, ai) true in & such 
that 
PA U { 6(d, a,), b < ai} kc Con(Z&). 
From this we have 
PA U {@)(~y)(~(x, Y) A b <Y)} kc Con(&). 
But this is impossible by Lemma 10 since the theory 
PA U {(3~)(3~)(6(~, Y) Ac<y)}U{c>~;m~0} 
is consistent since it has pi as a model (with c = ai - 1). 
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By construction, we have a, > a2 > a3 >. . . and furthermore it follows directly 
from the definition of forcing that, for any j and any a E 1.&1, we have 
Jui lk Con(Z_Xa) if and only if a <a, for all i. Then YClt Con(ZE,) and rClt 
(Vx)Con(Z2”)+ Con(Z.Xx+,)) but YtuL Con(ZLQ. In other words, induction on 
the formula Con(PA,) with respect to a is not intuitionistically forced in the 
PA-normal Kripke model X. q Theorem 8 
We conclude with a few questions. Firstly, is every intuitionistic theory 
equivalent to a theory XT for some classical theory T? If not, is there a natural 
characterization of the intuitionistic theories of the form XT? In particular, is 
there a classical theory T such that HA is equal to XT? 
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